Answering a Moral Objection

Introduction

            Morality is by and large a rather pressing concern for the many. The reason that this is the case is that morality is a part of everyday life and concern. For example, should I lie on my taxes, do I tell my wife that I decided to not remain committed to her, do children go and wreak havoc on the world, etc. These are things that go through people’s minds on a daily basis and are by no means limited to these questions only but anything that deals with how we interact with others and our own personal integrity of what is right and wrong. The goal in this discourse is to lay out a basic case or explanation of several facets of moral understanding such as moral facts, moral knowledge, moral transformation, and moral rationality. These points will be educational but the main concern here is to answer some objections to the moral knowledge question. In essence, how do we know about morality, if in fact, we can know it. Since this writing subscribes to a form of moral realism the objections will come from an evolutionary rejection of realism. The goal here is to show how these evolutionary objections of moral realism is less probable than accepting moral realism and show that moral knowledge, though not always clear, can be known to a respectable degree.

Facets of Morality

            Moral facts are the first component of morality and has two sub-categories found within it (moral value and moral obligations). It could be said that this first component deals primarily with moral ontology or the being or foundations of morality itself. Baggett and Walls say this, “the ontological facts, are, primarily, facts about moral goodness and rightness, values and duties.”[1] When someone asks questions about the origins of morality then these are questions regarding the ontology of morality. As seen from Baggett and Walls, this is mainly the question of the good/ right and value/ duties. Simply put, we want to know what is right and is it good or is there anything that is good and do people have value and do we have duties or obligations to one another.

            Taking moral realism very seriously, you can find that C.S. Lewis in The Abolition of Man, arguing for such a thing and calls it the Tao, he says this, “if nothing is obligatory for its own sake, nothing is obligatory at all.”[2] Lewis’ main point is that if people can think of one thing that is obligatory then this is a case but if there is nothing that can be considered someone’s duty for its own reason than there is nothing at all to bind us. The whole point is to show that there is this Tao that is over people and that most people recognize this pull to some higher moral calling, i.e. to do the right and the good. Found in the appendix of this book one can see the vast similarities between differing parts of the world regarding questions of moral duty and that this seems to point to some moral code that transcends humanity as a whole. A point that also seems relatively powerful is the fact that most inherently believe or see that human beings have some special value that has not been distributed to other creatures living in this reality. This is of course in no way saying that other creatures do not have value at all but rather humans carry a special type or kind of value. Baggett and Walls say this regarding value, “all humans possess a right to life and other natural rights, prior to any governmental fiats concerning such rights.”[3] This is not a winning argument on its own but it does seem rather recognizable to those who are people and understand that the rights humans carry with them are outside of any hierarchal structure that man may create.

            Next (and the primary focus of this paper), is moral knowledge and whether people can have it or how people can attain it. Dostoevsky and even Nietzsche have concluded that without God you cannot have morality (in the traditional sense) and others suggest that morality is just plain (without God).[4] Based on a theistic worldview, moral knowledge would obviously come from God as Evans suggests, “if humans are created by God, all of their knowledge must be derived from cognitive capacities God has given them.”[5] However, on the other side of this, if there is no God how can one come to know moral knowledge? Moral knowledge is an active process of seeking out what can be known based on the information that one has. This information as a primary means may come from the intrinsic conscience, one that is functioning properly without ailment or major cognitive issues. Another means could be from the Bible, though not a primary means for most people since not all people subscribe to Christianity. Also, another possible means of moral knowledge could be from a fellow man who seems to have a better grasp on the things of morality. However, it should be noted that never is “moral knowledge of ordinary (or any other) agents passive.”[6] Though moral knowledge may seem as if it is the most ambiguous part, it may well be a very important part because knowledge in the most basic sense is important to an agent’s essential functionality towards anything.

            The next component is that of moral transformation which by and large sounds very similar to what it causes one to envision in the mind. The reason for such a comment is that this is the realm where most people live their lives, it is the practical side of things or the living out of moral standards. Immanuel Kant says to live out morality it takes a “revolution of the will.”[7] At the very foundation of this point is what view best propagates the idea of instilling in its adherents this revolution of the will or what best captures the essence and motivation to live accordingly to some moral standard that is above themselves, living the goodness and the rightness. There is this idea that there is some moral standard that mankind desires to reach or maintain but it seems very difficult to do so. However, under a theistic construal of the world, mankind is provided with sources to help them attain a higher standard, not maintain but simply make reaching a certain point possible. When dealing with the moral gap it may seem that, “if naturalism does not offer enough resources to hold out a realistic hope for moral transformation, it does not follow that the high moral demand is unreasonable, but rather that naturalism itself may simply be inadequate to the task.”[8] Pointing out this is only illustrative and not suggestive, but the goal is after showing some objective moral standard, it is possible to reach that by changing how one lives, with the help of resources if necessary and naturalism seems to lack a viable manner in which to attain or reach this moral standard.

            The last component to look at is this idea of moral rationality. This, in a nutshell, is showing that the moral view that one holds is rationally understood and that the existence of morality is indeed rational, even preferable (from a non-theistic perspective). More specifically, this point deals with the “convergence of happiness and virtue.”[9] From a theistic perspective it can be relatively simple in reconciling these two concepts since there is a God who cares for us and desires to see mankind function at a high level but also find peace and rest (i.e. ultimate happiness) in him. However, this convergence is slightly more difficult to make sense of when taken on secular or atheistic grounds. The reason for this is that nature does not seem to encourage happiness or virtue as two things that come together but rather that, in most cases, diverge. Since humanity (on a naturalistic view) is primarily concerned with surviving or living out our desires or happiness is based around things that are pleasurable, one should be able to see that this can turn hedonistic or selfish very quickly. When thinking on virtue, most people could agree that it is almost anti-self and that it is more about developing character traits that are in line with the greater good. Based on this view, one would be hard pressed to marry these ideas. Put another way, you cannot have your cake and eat it too. Given you accept morality and that you desire to live up to that standard this is a real problem for those who are not willing to accept a theistic account of the world.

Evolutionary Objection and Counter-Objection

            Now, moving on to the main purpose of this discourse is some evolutionary objection to moral realism. The main idea that will be presented here is that if moral realism is true then this “entails moral skepticism.”[10] This is simply the main idea but there are some sub-parts that will be pointed out along the way. The point to be made here is that based on this view, at best, belief in moral realism is really just a skeptical moral view.

            Why would this objection be disconcerting? The main reason is if this view has some plausibility then it causes a rift in the moral knowledge that we think we have. So, at best the only position one can take concerning morality is one of skepticism and if you are skeptical about morality, it may as well not exist. Now, there is what is called the Standard Evolutionary Debunking Argument (EDA) but there are several objections to this so Morton is proposing a New EDA in its place. Below is a full explication of this New EDA:

1.     Assume that moral realism is true.

2.     Empirical Premise: Evolution has strongly influenced our belief in categorical reasons.

3.     Autonomy: There is no independent justification for belief in categorical reasons.

4.     If (2) and (3), then our belief in categorical reasons is defeated.

5.     So, our belief in categorical reasons is defeated. (2, 3, 4)

6.     All positive moral claims entail that at least one categorical reason exists, and we are justified in believing that this entailment holds.

7.     If P entails Q, we are justified in believing that P entails Q, and our belief that Q is defeated, then we do not know that P.

8.     So, we do not have any positive moral knowledge. (5, 6, 7)

9.     Therefore, if moral realism is true, then we do not have any positive moral knowledge. (1, 8)[11]

What has to be done from this point is to navigate all of this philosophical jargon and see if what is being suggested holds and if there are any flaws intrinsic to this argument. This may prove to be a little technical or difficult to understand but it will be the goal to present this in the simplest manner possible.

            Firstly, it may prove well to see if the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises that have been set up. In a sort of prima facie way, the manner in which this has been structured does seem to follow seamlessly to the end. However, if one takes the time to read through this structure slowly, I think that this initial strength will begin to fade. It does not seem to follow that (assuming evolution is true) even if evolution has influenced mankind’s belief in some categorical reasons and there being no independent (outside of itself) justification for those beliefs that categorical reasons are therefore defeated. The reason for asserting that these do not seem to lead to that middle conclusion is that Plantinga tackled this idea about properly basic beliefs with respect to God. With that said, this idea of categorical reasons seems to fit in a similar fashion (i.e. as belief in God) into the properly basic category. Plantinga offers this concerning these kinds of beliefs, “they are often produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth.”[12] He also links this idea of properly basic beliefs to memory beliefs but makes note that this does not apply in cases where no warrant is justified. It could be argued that there is warrant in the properly basic belief in categorical reasons since they essentially govern the manner in which humanity interacts on a fundamental level. So, for this case, it seems as though belief in the categorical reasons/ imperative is properly basic. Based on this fact, the defeat of categorical reasons does not follow necessarily from those premises.

            Continuing along similar paths is this idea of independent justification, which as stated above is, basically, a justifiable reason is outside of the thing being justified. In a way, you cannot base your justification for categorical reasons on categorical reasons. However, as noted above since this belief seems to fit nicely into the properly basic category this does not seem to apply. But let it be assumed that it, in fact, does not, is there anything else that can be said about it. There seems to me to be a fundamental flaw that is at the very beginning of this venture. Obviously, this New EDA is assuming that moral realism is true to make the point against it but what else is being assumed as fact or as it is the case? This whole idea is being based on evolution as preeminently true. Though I would not stake the whole claim simply on this fact it does seem to be assuming a great deal. Could this New EDA be as effectively used if evolution was not the assumed worldview? The answer to this would have to be in the negative since on a theistic worldview the categorical reasons have not been influenced by some outside (random) force but rather have been mathematically and logical calculated as part of the natural law (or the Tao). Based on this new assumption of a theistic universe it would seem if you have justification in believing in an all-powerful creator of the universe then it would follow that one would also believe in this overarching categorical imperative as well. Though there is a vast amount of information that is not being touched on concerning the whole structure of this New EDA it seems fine to leave it off at this point and make the move more in the direction of providing a look at the epistemic question of moral knowledge.

            To begin with, regarding knowledge on anything there needs to be a lowering of certain expectations on the level of epistemic confidence one can have. This is by no means a submitting to skepticism, but it is maintaining a certain level of epistemic humility. There are very rare cases in which the knowledge that one has is going to be at the level of one hundred percent confident. What is interesting is that Kant makes the point of there seems to be an objective end for things as a whole which is based on reason alone and that individual beings have their own subjective ends which cannot be placed on others outside of that particular agent.[13] Kant also makes the point that this is a kind of knowledge that is a priori. When taking this idea into account it does seem more plausible if one is to assume a theistic universe since it follows that if an all-powerful, all-good God created everything there would be some sort of law that governed actions much the same as the law of gravity applies to the interaction of bodies with the universe itself. Following St. Thomas in a way, the good precedes the right.[14] What is being suggested is that one should find if there is good in the universe and then determine from that point that right must exist if good exists. If there is good in the universe it only seems logical that there must be some kind of measurement of the good and that there must be some action or lack of certain actions that would constitute goodness.

            Based on this assumption, it seems plausible that moral knowledge would be something instilled in humanities very being. This (in my mind) is the point where the distinction between the order of knowing and the order of being converge.[15] The order of knowing is something that one takes (in a sense) a priori and the order of being will follow. Now, this is not to misplace the order of being which is actually an ontological concern but rather I am suggesting that foundationally morality has its essential being in God, our knowledge of this morality primarily comes from God and this sense of morality is intrinsic and in a symbiotic relationship with our core being. There are obviously many ways in which moral knowledge could or can be conveyed to human beings (e.g. the Bible, other morally sounds texts, people, observance, etc.) but there is still a level of epistemic humility that must be maintained in these cases. If our knowledge and being comes essentially from God, then one can be confident in the fact that this knowledge is sound. This is of course not an extensive explication of all of the nuances of moral knowledge nor is it a thoroughgoing attack to the New EDA, but this is the beginning stages of something that could be further developed in this complex area of questions.

Conclusion

            This has not been a massively extensive survey of the topic at hand, but the goal was not to provide a knockdown argument against the presented case or for the case provided in this discourse. But what has been done is shedding light on some intrinsic weaknesses within the New EDA and provide some basic starting point for moral knowledge. This is a vastly complex arena that these questions raise and it may take the development of a new epistemology that can marry the idea of basic knowledge of the world and moral knowledge in particular. Either way, moral knowledge is an area that needs more seeking involved and is by no means an open and shut case when it comes to the knowing aspect. Moral knowledge at least can be seen as properly basic and has justification in this sense and the warrant to follow based on the overall effect of morality on the functionality and propagation of humanity. Let that be a confidence booster in knowing that moral knowledge is at the very least possible and not so easily pitched to the side.

Bibliography

Baggett, David and Jerry L. Walls. God and Cosmos. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Baggett, David and Jerry L. Walls. Good God: Theistic Foundations of Morality. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Evans, C. Stephen. God and Moral Obligation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Geiger, Ido. “How Do We Acquire Moral Knowledge? Is Knwoing Our Duty Ever Passive—Two Questions for Martin Stick.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 no. 5 (2015): 990-997.

Kant, Immanuel. Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. New York: Harper and Row, 1793.

Lewis, C.S. The Abolition of Man. New York: HarperOne, 1947.

Morton, Justin. “A New Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association (2016): 233-253.

Plantinga, Alvin. Knowledge and Christian Belief. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015.

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[1] David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, God and Cosmos (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 113.

[2] C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York: HarperOne, 1947), 40.

[3] Baggett and Walls, God and Cosmos, 117.

[4] C. Stephen Evans, God and Moral Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 1.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ido Geiger, “How Do We Acquire Moral Knowledge? Is Knwoing Our Duty Ever Passive—Two Questions for Martin Stick” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 no. 5 (2015): 995.

[7] Baggett and Walls, God and Cosmos, 114.

[8] Ibid., 220.

[9] Ibid., 244

[10] Justin Morton, “A New Evolutionary Debunking Argument Against Moral Realism” Journal of the American Philosophical Association (2016): 233.

[11] Morton, “Evolutionary Debunking Argument,” 239.

[12] Alvin Plantinga, Knowledge and Christian Belief (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 36.

[13] Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone New York: Harper and Row, 1793), 6.

[14] David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, Good God: Theistic Foundations of Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 163.

[15] Baggett and Walls, Good God, 160.