On Truth
Contents
Outline…………………………………………………………………………………………...iii
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………4
Epistemic Foundation of Truth…………………………………………………………………4
Foundational Understanding of Knowledge………………………………………………5
Religious Epistemology………………………………………...........................................9
Views of Truth…………………………………………………………………………………..13
Coherence View of Truth………………………………………………………………...13
Pragmatic View of Truth………………………………………………………………...16
Correspondence View of Truth…………………………………………………………..18
Experiential Truth……………………………………………………………………………...22
Preferential Truths…..…………………………………………………………………...22
Universal Truths………………………………………………………………………….25
Universal Versus Preferential Truths…………………………………………………….27
Defending Truth………………………………………………………………………….30
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………34
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………….36
Outline
I. Introduction
II. Epistemic Foundation of Truth
A. Foundational Understanding of Knowledge
B. Religious Epistemology
III. Views of Truth
A. Coherence View of Truth
B. Pragmatic View of Truth
C. Correspondence View of Truth
IV. Experiential Truth
A. Preferential Truths (my term)
B. Universal Truths
C. Universal Versus Preferential Truths
D. Defending Truth
V. Conclusion
Introduction
This particular discourse is something that should prove to be vitally important since the value of truth is being relegated to the dark recesses of some abandoned room. The essential thrust of what shall be presented is on truth, its value, how people understand it, and how it differs from what the postmodern movement would have the world to believe it to be. A correct epistemology is essential to formulating a positive case for the existence of objective truth, and the postmodern ideal of subjective truth is a position that is both unviable and unlivable. This is the central thought of what is to proceed from here, the idea of objective truth.
The basic structure that will frame the argument here is that one must have a foundational understanding of knowledge or at least how mankind acquires it. Different views of truth will be presented, in that there are differing theories of how one comes to understand knowledge or truth. Truth is essentially an epistemic venture when one talks about truth they are really asking how one can come to a right or correct knowledge of something. So, having an understanding of how one can come to knowledge is a building block to this whole endeavor of truth finding. Lastly, the point of experiential truth will be explored which will consist of the central argument of this discourse to showcase the absolute idea of objective or universal truths existing and that this has to be the case for one to achieve certain functionality within reality. Foundational to all of this are certain presuppositions about reality but those are not the worry here but rather that these presuppositions coherently lead to the conclusions presented is the goal.
Epistemic Foundation of Truth
Since, as stated above, it is important for one to understand the basic pursuit of knowledge it only seems fitting to provide a section dedicated to this basic understanding. This will be a basic look into epistemology in general without digging too deep into that well. Since the different views of truth are sunk a little deeper into epistemology one has to have a basic movement through the levels of this study to understand the outcome.
Foundational Understanding of Knowledge
Epistemology in the most general sense deals with people in nearly all situations of life. Knowledge does not simply pertain to the deeply profound questions, but it also encompasses the basic knowledge that people take for granted. When do these questions of knowledge hit people? As Wood suggests, “the short answer is almost anytime we stop to ask ourselves such questions as how we acquire our beliefs, whether what we, or others, believe is true, whether we believe rationally, or whether we ought to reconsider beliefs that have been criticized.”[1] What this is saying is that when people ask questions that are knowledge seeking they are embarking on an epistemological journey.
One thing about this journey, however, should be pointed out and that is not all knowledge seeking questions are on “par” with one another.[2] This means that not all answers come bearing the same credentials as other answers. This point will be discussed later on and goes towards the differentiation between preferential truths (my term) and universal truth (i.e. truths that are true for all peoples, at all times, in all places). Proceeding directly from this set is the different kinds of knowledge that are present in the world.
As implied from the above, that answers to questions do not have the same grounding/ credentials as others, leads directly to the area of differing types of knowledge. These different types of knowledge could be described as, “(1) propositional knowledge (knowing about facts), (2) knowledge by acquaintance (knowing something or someone directly), (3) skill knowledge (know-how).”[3] At first glance, one should be able to determine the difference inherent in these descriptions but for the sake of ease, some examples may help to clarify. Knowledge by acquaintance is as simple as stating that one knows there is a flower in front of them. This is true based on the fact that there is a flower in front of the observer and they know what a flower is (acquainted with the idea of a flower). A propositional form of knowledge could be that one knows that Barrack Obama was President of the United States. This knowledge comes from a proposition and a proposition, in this case, is the “content of a sentence or statement.”[4] Skill knowledge, simply put, is the knowledge of how to do something, such as he knows how to repair a car. This knowledge is something that is gained from experience or training and applies to the ability to do some sort of thing. Now that there is a basic understanding of knowledge there is another aspect that needs to be met before one can move to the idea of truth, that is belief.
One may ask, “what does belief have to do with knowledge and that knowledge being true?” Well, it is not belief in and of itself that alone leads one to true knowledge, but it is a functional part of the equation that leads to truth and it works in conjunction with knowledge. Knowledge, belief, and truth are all part of this logical chain that connects together for someone to form a coherent and functional form of truth. For this concept to be as clear as possible, Armstrong provides a clear rendition of this idea:
There is an analysis of the concept of knowledge which has been put forward again and again in the history of philosophy. Its first recorded occurrence is in Plato’s Meno (87-8). According to this analysis, A knows that p if, and only if, three conditions are satisfied. Two of these conditions differ somewhat (and not merely verbally) in different formulations. But there is a common form which all the formulations satisfy. A knows that p if, and only if: (i) The Truth-condition is satisfied: p is true, (ii) The Belief-condition is satisfied: A believes that p or A is certain that p, etc., (iii) The Evidence-condition is satisfied: A has adequate evidence for p or A has good reason for believing that p, etc.[5]
Of course, this is an extensive citation but the information that it entails goes towards this foundational understanding of the concept of knowledge and how it connects and leads to truth. The main focus for this is point (ii) where one has to believe that p (p being a certain proposition). An example may help clarify exactly what this means, suppose that one asks a friend what time it is, and they tell you the time according to their watch, but they say that it cannot be correct (they do not believe their watch is correct). Based on this does the friend know the time? The answer is in the negative because in order to have knowledge you have to have a belief in that knowledge and without that belief in the knowledge one cannot actually have that knowledge, so belief is an important part of the pursuit of knowledge, in this sense. Within philosophy, there has been a denial by some of the belief category but for the sake of the assignment here it will be assumed that the belief condition is a strong part of the pursuit of truth (in opposition to the some).
The last point to be made here prior to moving forward is that all of this requires or implies proper functioning. Proper cognitive functioning is essentially foundational to what is and will be presented throughout this discourse. The idea of proper cognitive function (as used here) means that the agent who is observing the world around them or is seeking truth, etc., is one that is not impeded by infections of the will (i.e. any physical condition that may adversely affect one’s mind, e.g. dementia). It is also assumed that there are not supernatural beings that are influencing the mind of the agent because if this were the case the person's conclusions could not be trusted because they were influenced by something outside of the mind and that it also degraded the ability to function. All of this assumes that all cognitive functions are in good working order. According to Wood, all this also implies that people use their emotions as well and against Descartes idea of pure reason.[6] So, to clarify this point of proper cognitive and emotional function, it means that there is nothing that is either internal or external to the particular observant agent that will impede or hinder their ability to come to a coherent and non-contradictory conclusion nor do those things negatively influence their functioning within reality. All of these things hinge together in that a person comes to a clear and functionally sufficient form of knowledge and then as a result to truth.
It may prove well to provide a short description of what a postmodern conception of knowledge or truth consists of prior to getting too deep into the weeds about the arguments that will be formed based on the extensive information regarding proper functioning, knowledge, and truth. Postmodernism is something that is intrinsically difficult to define but generally speaking (with regard to truth/ knowledge), each person has their own view of truth and this is true for that person but not necessarily for any other person. So, what is called for is a subjective form of truth and knowledge (this will be touched on in greater depth later). Of course, there are theories of truth that propagate this idea of truth but what will be submitted within this discourse is that they fall extraordinarily short with regard to providing a viable model for livability. It can be said that for this model (postmodernism) knowledge is still knowledge but in a different sense than what has been presented thus far.
Moving forward, what is to follow from here is to go from a broad sense of knowledge, understanding, and truth to a more specific idea. Religious epistemology is epistemology in the sense that it is seeking knowledge, but this is more about the “exploration of the epistemic status of religious truth claims, their rationality, and warrant.”[7] Religious epistemology is something that entails both epistemology and the philosophy of religion.[8] This serves an important function within this argument of seeking truth in that it focuses on the religious aspect of the pursuit of truth and knowledge but also it will hopefully lead to an experiential component or practical component that will culminate into a fully defensible position for truth that makes it both true and livable. This issue will now be the general focus.
Religious Epistemology
The specifics of this line of reasoning deals with knowledge in general but with warrant and justification in particular, as it pertains to religious or Christian belief. Under this section, it will be addressed how this fits (religious epistemology) under epistemology but also how it can lead to a coherent and functional view of truth in a practical sense. It should be stated that this area of study has a lot of varying factors within it but what will be presented is simply the view that this discourse takes and will not seek to expound upon the plethora of ideas that are intrinsic to this particular area of study. This will help to remain on track with the content that is important and assist in not getting lost in the details so as to create confusion amongst those who do not have a particularly broad understanding of this area of study. Something else to add regarding this Reformed Epistemology, it is generally seen as coming from a Calvinistic type of theology and that of Cornelius Van Til and his (Van Til’s) epistemology is closely tied to three “biblical motifs of creation, fall, and redemption.”[9] These flavors can be seen in what Plantinga offers but does so with a little more philosophical emphasis.
When looking at religious epistemology there is a clear route (from a Christian perspective) that one may see and it has been clearly and extensively laid out by Alvin Plantinga. Though this Reformed Epistemology (Plantinga) is more about knowledge and Christian belief, in particular, it does feed one right into a path that is directed towards locating truth. Plantinga in Knowledge and Christian Belief lays out that belief in the Christian faith is a rational pursuit and has shown that this belief is properly basic.[10] Of course, this line of thought goes a little outside of the purview of this treatise but what is found in this text can help round out a perspective on truth. If it is not rational to hold certain beliefs (in this case Christianity) then that particular view could not stand a chance of being a bringer of truth in any sense. Truth in and of itself will be predicated upon the fact that belief in it is basic and rational for it to be true for anyone, truth cannot be and will not be irrational, in the sense that it will not contradict reality or other absolute/ universal truths.
For the purposes of the arguments that are being presented here the focus from Plantinga will be his thoughts on warrant/ justification. These are foundational aspects to truth because (as hinted at above) truth based on its very nature will provide a person warrant or justification for holding that belief since it is in fact true. One can see how this makes sense and how these are connected together. One could, in essence, be justified in holding a wrong belief (based on the information and experience they have) but one could not be unjustified/ unwarranted in holding an absolutely true belief. The latter presents a logical contradiction since holding a true belief will always be warranted. Without delving too deeply into this process of warrant Plantinga submits that holding properly basic beliefs in accordance with warrant can produce knowledge, he states, “these beliefs, therefore, can meet the conditions for warrant; when they do, if they are strong enough, then they constitute knowledge.”[11] Knowledge in the broadest sense is not the overall goal but rather coming to a true knowledge or in the sense of the non-white and black muddiness of the state of the world, at least a more than likely estimation that the knowledge we gain is true (not all true knowledge will be as clear as one may think). This unclearness of the pursuit of knowledge is what has led to the differing views within the study of knowledge, however being bogged down by this at this point seems frivolous.
Since this particular section is about religious epistemology there is something that Plantinga offers that is foundational to the idea of Christian knowledge and belief, it is the aspect of the sensus divinitatis.[12] This concept is actually something that started with John Calvin but is being used here by Plantinga and it serves a specific purpose. But for the sake of clarity and specificity Plantinga has this to say concerning the sensus divinitatis, “a disposition or set of dispositions to form theistic beliefs in various circumstances or stimuli that trigger the working of this sense of divinity.”[13] What this means and where it goes is that since (moving under the presumption of theism) there is a Creator God, mankind has this innate sense of divinity within them that leads to this belief in God existing. This idea goes back to what is considered a basic belief. Moreland and Craig offer some insight into this,
Just as perceptual beliefs like “there is a tree” are not based on arguments from more basic beliefs but arise spontaneously in me when I am in the circumstances of a tree’s appearing to be there, so the belief “God exists” arises spontaneously in me when I am in appropriate circumstances, such as moments of guilt, gratitude or awe at nature’s grandeur, as a result of the working of the sensus divinitatis. Plantinga emphasizes that God’s existence is not inferred from such circumstances—such an argument would be manifestly inadequate—rather, the circumstances form the context in which the sensus divinitatis operates to produce a basic belief in God.[14]
The point here is not that this belief in God comes from nature and assuming that because it is so great there must be a creator so one is to believe in God, this is rather circular in thinking. But it is within the context of these experienced situations that this innate sense of divinity works and thus forms this basic belief there is a Creator God. Now, this is all been in the most basic sense about belief in general and Christian belief in particular, all of this is a part of the framework that truth fits neatly (but not in a completely neat fashion) into. Truth (as stated above) has to be believed for the person to have that knowledge. To state one thing again, believing in something does not make it true necessarily but belief in something has to be there to necessarily constitute it as knowledge. Also, something that is true does not cease to be true simply because the agent does not believe it but again the agent must believe it for it to constitute knowledge.
Although what has been offered here has dealt with belief and knowledge these are important basic concepts to have under one’s belt prior to embarking on this quest for truth. Truth is this ever-elusive thing that has brought about a great deal of contention surrounding it and hence why this discourse is being written. Since, this piece is being written from a Christian perspective exploring this idea of religious epistemology is appropriate for gaining the correct perspective, even though what has been presented on the topic is noticeably shallow (i.e. does not contain all of the information concerning that topic). This all culminates into the next section which will discuss the major theories of truth. There are three (that this discourse will mainly focus on) that will be looked at in some relative depth since these are the major views of truth and each has its own flavor regarding this topic. With this in mind it would be good to take a look at these theories of truth so that they can at some point be measured against one another.
Views of Truth
Moving on from the basic understanding of knowledge, in general, the goal is to proceed from that point with some concepts of truth. This section will simply present the main theories of truth but will not be an exhaustive account of all the possibilities of truth theory that may exist. The point is not to provide a superbly detailed account of all possible views of truth but rather to provide the most popular accounts for truth theory so that one may have a good understanding of what has been held throughout most of history. Though these three main theories of truth will be submitted for examination this particular discourse does not subscribe to all the views as equal across the board. It should be said early on that what will be presented later on will be a form of the Correspondence theory of truth since what has been suggestive up to this point is that what is true will be congruent with reality. But with that said, below will be the general investigation of these three main theories of truth and having a broad understanding of these concepts will be important for one to make an informed decision about how one feels truth is best explained.
Coherence View of Truth
The Coherence theory of truth will be the first theory that is explained and examined. From a basic standpoint, this view holds that something is true based on its “coherence or consistency with other beliefs.”[15] One could also say that truth is built into a “web of beliefs.”[16] In effect, what is being said is that truth is based solely on something a person believes matches up with other things that they hold or believe to be true. For example, if one believes that they are a vegetable (the edible kind), they believe that vegetables are conscious and that anyone who tries to tell them otherwise was lying, then this person would have a consistent set of beliefs but would be mistaken.[17] With regard to the Coherence theory, Lemos purports, “Proponents of the coherence theory of truth, however, treat coherence not merely as a source of justification; they take coherence to be a condition of truth. They hold that for a proposition to be true is nothing more than a matter of its coherence with other propositions.”[18]
Based simply on this shortened version of what the Coherence theory offers one should be able to see the basic trouble someone can get into with this view. To begin with, if person A has a set of beliefs that are completely coherent with all of their other beliefs and they run across a person B who has a set of contradictory beliefs to person A but they too are completely coherent with their set of beliefs (person B), the coherentist would simply reply that both people have truth. However, even a cursory glance at this would make someone see that this breaks the law of noncontradiction. The coherentist then either has to redevelop their approach or they must reject the laws of logic for this theory to be an adequate rendition of what truth actually is. There is one matter that should be cleared up concerning this view and that is the fact of justification.
When one is talking about justification for something, people typically point to what is being said or believed that it is coherent with other things. Lemos expounds upon this idea when discussing what critics say about this theory, “that we should not confuse a criterion of justification with a condition of truth and we should not assume that because we have a criterion of justification we have ipso facto a condition of truth.”[19] Basically, what is being said here is that coherence plays an important part in justifying something that is true but that coherence is not indicative of truth itself. Obviously, if someone is suggesting something that is completely outlandish, and they suggest that it is true, those who are discussing whether or not what is being said is, in fact, true will look for how well it coheres to other things that are known to be true. This goes back to this line of reasoning being a justification for truth but not being necessary, or the end all be all of truth in itself.
Foundationally, this theory of truth is suggesting that the only manner in which the value of truth can be assessed is based on what has been suggested above. The Coherence theory of truth is one that can be seen within the postmodern framework but is not a pervasive one (i.e. is not held by all postmodern proponents). The main reason for this theory not being the pervasive one is because those within the postmodern movement do not all share the same views of things. Postmodernism (as stated above) is a movement that is difficult to lump together into one category but the movement, in general, is dedicated to truth being relativistic to individuals. As can be seen from the account given above, this theory is very much suggesting that truth is relative to individuals. This is the case because person A and person B can believe opposite things, but based on this view, hold true beliefs simply because they fit coherently within that persons constructed context of beliefs.
Pragmatic View of Truth
Next, the Pragmatic theory of truth will be explained and examined. The reason for starting off with these two views is (1) because these two sections will be relatively shorter than the correspondence section and (2) the Correspondence theory is the view that is being defended (or a version of it) within this discourse. This is not to minimize either this or the previously discussed theory but rather is to bring the focus more readily on the one that is believed to be the most adequate answer for what is being suggested throughout this writing. Of course (which will be discussed later) the Correspondence theory is not without its critics, but no theory is ultimately without criticisms.
To begin, the Pragmatic theory of truth is one that is foundationally found within the postmodern mindset. Moreland and Craig give a philosophical presentation of what this view holds to be the case regarding truth, “in general terms, the pragmatic theory implies that a belief P is true if and only if P works or is useful to have.”[20] Stated a little more plainly Groothuis suggests this, “the general pragmatic understanding of truth is that a belief is true only if it produces desirable or beneficial effects in the long run.”[21] One can see that for the pragmatist the essential thrust of what constitutes truth is something that is good or has a good result, generally speaking. It could be asked what if this good result affects a certain group of people badly? Well, this does not mean that it is not true, truth is dependent on the majority of people that it benefits (in the collectivistic version).
There are of course reasons for taking this position and Posey gives a rather succinct synopsis of this,
Pragmatism’s insistence that there is no separation between minds and nature, or knowledge and the external world. That instead we need to rid ourselves of what Dewey calls our tendency toward ‘pernicious dualisms’ that separate inquirers from the environment of inquiry, and take the project of philosophy to be fundamentally transcendental—or concerned with the nature of things ‘behind’ what is empirically given.[22]
As can be seen from this perspective those who hold to this particular view assume that if someone breaks up truth as outside of ourselves then there is a “dualism” that is created. Those that hold to this form of truth are concerned about the group, it is essentially collectivistic in a sense, but it can also be individualistic in a sense (collectivistic version versus individualistic version) because this view can be broken up into cultures.
Cultural pragmatism is based on these same principles but says that truth is what is good or beneficial for this certain group of people (ethnocentric). It is not hard to see how this fits perfectly into a postmodern (generally speaking) mindset and how this feeds into the idea of relativism. Something else that seems to be foundational to this line of truth-seeking is that by this dualism truth is placed into this “special cognitive virtue” category and this does not sit well in the pragmatist's mind.[23] Stich has this to say,
For pragmatists, there are no special cognitive or epistemological values. There are just values. Reasoning, inquiry, and cognition are viewed as tools that we use in an effort to achieve what we value. And like any other tools, they are to be assessed by determining how good a job they do at achieving what we value. So on the pragmatist view, the good cognitive strategies for a person to use are those that are likely to lead to the states of affairs that he or she finds intrinsically valuable. This is, of course, a thoroughly relativistic account of good reasoning…. There is, in the pragmatist tradition, a certain tendency to downplay or even deny the epistemic relativism to which pragmatism leads. But on my view, this failure of nerve is a great mistake.[24]
As can be seen from what is stated above, it is recognized that this framework is relativistic, but Stich is saying that not recognizing this is a mistake. Truth is based upon the good that it produces same as any other “tool” that people may use.
This view is not without its problems, however, since it is intrinsically relativistic how is it that anyone is to come to any actual truth. Since truth is what is good for some person or groups of persons then each group will have something that is true for them and not true for the other. But does each position constitute truth? Truth (as traditionally understood) is something that is, in fact, the case so it cannot be two separate things at the same time (law of non-contradiction). What this view is putting forward is that truth can, in fact, be two different things at the same time so at a cursory glance it should be plainly obvious that, functionally speaking, this view of truth simply fails at producing something that is “good” for truth.
Correspondence View of Truth
As has been stated throughout this discourse the view that is primarily being propagated is this Correspondence theory or a form of it in a basic sense. This in no way eliminates potential issues that arise within this theory nor does it suggest that the truth value of this particular view is not without fault or is the end all be all of truth. Each view has its ups and its downs, but it is the personal view and the view of many proponents of this theory that it best answers this nagging question of truth. Truth, as has been stated, is really an epistemological question and it could be said that the above views fall short epistemologically because on those views nothing is objective but subjective. To clarify, objective means that it deals with a particular object which would stay as it was no matter the viewer and subjective deals with a subject (i.e. a person) and things vary to each subject.
Now, the Correspondence theory of truth can be plainly stated as “a belief or statement is true only if it matches with, reflects or corresponds to the reality it refers to.”[25] Aristotle gives a rather early rendition of this same thinking in his Categories paper and says this,
Statements and opinions themselves remain unaltered in all respects: it is by the alteration in the facts of the case that the contrary quality comes to be theirs. The statement ‘he is sitting’ remains unaltered, but it is at one time true, at another false, according to circumstances. What has been said of statements applies also to opinions.[26]
Aristotle also connects truth to the being of man and one can also think of Descartes when he talks about, I think therefore I am (I am a thinking person and exist which cannot be questioned) which could be viewed as corresponding to the reality that it cannot be readily disputed that we exist.[27]
Of course, existing and what is real is more of a metaphysical question but in searching for truth one is looking for what is real (in a sense) so these concepts are closely linked together. When a person is looking for truth, they ultimately are looking for something that is concretely known and that it fits within the structure of what is real. The Correspondence theory could be viewed as realism since truth is not something that is constructed within societies (postmodernism) or some other context, but it is discovered in the world, truth is “independent” of you, the subject.[28]
As can be seen, this view essentially states that reality dictates truth, but this leads to another issue and that is what exactly is real? This is what critics argue against this view. Lemos says that this theory is not “very informative” and that the “notion of a fact is obscure.”[29] It can be conceded that these objections do have warrant but the main goal is not to suggest that this theory is without fault or to be a staunch proponent of this theory but as fate would have it this theory seems the most adept at maintaining the fact of objectivity of truth. Since, as seen above, the other views offer something that is not, in fact, objective or plainly stated, is true regardless of location or feeling at a certain time, the Correspondence theory remains the best chance to live most accurately to the precepts found in the world. The point here is also not to get bogged down by arguing the finer points of metaphysical concepts of the real or things of that nature but one can note that they have a conscious mind, so long as their cognitive faculties are functioning properly then what they believe to be the case will adhere to their perception of the real world. Existence is at the heart of this conversation but not of the main concern, but existence does play a role in discovering truth because to exist as oneself the place where one exists must exist as well because something that exists cannot do so within something that is nonexistent. Thus, the real issue is discovering what corresponds to reality across all spectrums of people. This will be discussed further later on but as for now, the focus is on learning about this particular theory.
Returning to the primary focus of this section Groothuis offers another statement on this topic, “truth, then, is an exclusive property that is not shared with all assertions.”[30] The basic idea here is that not all propositions carry equal weight and one must discover or understand the truth-bearer. When someone makes a declarative statement, they are essentially staking “a claim on reality by stipulating that such and such is the case.”[31] Something that seems to be interesting is that without a firmly planted sense of what truth is or there not being any actual truth would seriously impede the ability for science to be done and to make declarative statements regarding the world. The reason for this is if truth (in the objective sense) does not exist then no matter what science submits as fact or observed things to be the case, people could simply say that they do not believe in what has been offered because it (1) does not fit within their already held beliefs or (2) it is not good for them (or their people group). What is interesting is that, “human science is submitted to the three conditions of there being (1) an intelligible structure of objective reality (the truth of things), and (2) the possibility of cognizing and (3) communicating that intelligible structure with satisfactory accuracy (the truth of signs).”[32] Science is only one category of thing that needs there to be truth in the objective sense but it seems plainly obvious that the Correspondence theory is what is most fitting for discovering what truth is. Truth, however, must be valued because if it is not then a culture or individual can construct whatever version of things they like and it will be true for them because keeping in line with what is logically the case is of little importance.
What has been given here has not been an exhaustive account of all of these three views and has primarily been informative. The goal was to provide some foundational starting point that would allow the argumentation that is to come to make more sense and to have a context to fit into. Having this foundational knowledge of these particular views will help establish the grounds from which my argument will proceed. One will have a better understanding of how to judge the view being offered by this discourse and see why the postmodern idea of truth is unviable. This knowledge will allow each person to make an educated determination on what is actually the case regarding truth. Moving on to the next section will be the major goal of this discourse and coming to some point at which truth has value, is discovered not made, effects one’s essential ability to function within reality and will show the negative sides of holding to a relativistic sense of truth.
Experiential Truth
Though this section may have a misleading title (perhaps) the intention is to point to the fact that truth matters and has a component that affects how one lives their life. Generally speaking, what has been submitted up to this point has been instructive, in the sense that it has been leading to a deeper knowledge of the area and that it had the goal of culminating into a presentation of the view being offered here. Within this section, the goal is to show a differentiation between preferential truths, which can be viewed as the subjective sense of what truth can be and universal truths, those things that are true regardless of the viewer. Obviously, this task is one that is quite large in its goals but the effects that it may have on the relativism and objectivism debate could be profound. It may be rather hopeful to assume that one can come to a more rounded and robust understanding of knowledge and truth but from this point, I shall proceed with this goal in mind. Preferential truths will now be the focus of the discussion.
Preferential Truths
Now, this idea should be contrasted with the overall argument that is being suggested in this discourse. Preferential truths are not necessary truths which Laymen puts it this way, “a necessary truth is one that cannot be false under any possible circumstances. Most philosophers think that mathematical truths, among others, are necessary.”[33] This idea of preferential truths is contra this statement, but it seems that such truths do in fact exist. From here it may be conceded that there is a form of relative style truth but that this does not constitute the whole of reality.
What is the point to talk about truths that are preferential in nature, does this not go against the overall goal of showing objective truth exists? The short answer is no but rather this is an attempt to show that there is common ground between what is suggested here and the postmodern thought. The goal is really to showcase that the postmodern idea of truth is unsustainable. However, it can be said that these preferential truths are subjective and pertain (typically) to the subject that is making a truth-claim. But this truth-claim is not one that is binding on those around this person since the value of it is nothing that would reflect an increase or decrease in one’s ability to function within reality.
Preferential truths are those kinds of truths that are propagated by an individual’s desire for something or some idea. For example, someone may prefer some sort of food product or may even prefer some brand of a certain product (i.e. car, clothes, etc) but on a fundamental level these things will not affect that person’s ability to effectively interact, either in an emotive or cognitive sense, with the world and those around them. These things are simply a matter of taste for that person. Essentially, for these sorts of things a person is setting up their own standard for the measure of an object’s truth value relative to themselves.[34] What can be seen from this is that there are simply objects (abstract or otherwise) that cannot be affected by this shifting of standards by individuals (i.e. mathematical truths).
Now, to differentiate these preferential statements a little further. There can be objectively true observations about someone’s preference for something. This can be based on certain properties that their preferred object may hold. For instance, if Peter likes chocolate ice cream but Betty does not this is not to say that one of them is objectively wrong in the sense of the tastiness of the object (e.g. the ice cream). But they both can observe objective properties about the ice cream such as its coldness or brownness (chocolate). However, one problem is that sometimes properties are misappropriated and “we perceive taste features as if they were one-place, objective properties.[35] Though the taste of something may be a property in and of itself (i.e. this object, in fact, has a taste) but the pleasurableness of that taste is not a property of that object but a property of the subject (i.e. the person doing the tasting). Of course, when dealing with something simplistic, such as ice cream, some may be inclined to say it is an oversimplification. However, let us look at the objective properties of the ice cream, such as its coldness or brownness. If one does not recognize these qualities in an objective sense, then one is liable to mislabel or misinterpret what they are in fact looking at or interacting with. From this perspective, it can be seen that the objective properties affect the observer’s ability to function appropriately within reality.
One last aspect to focus on will be to look at the propositional logic side of preferential truths. When looking at these types of situations there may be some who believe that when looking at preferential truths each subject is simply talking about the same proposition, however, this is not the case. For instance, if one is discussing how tasty a particular thing is, call this proposition one (P1) and another person disagrees their position creates a new proposition (P2). What is important to note for preferential truths is that their truth value is based on the subject and not the form of the proposition nor is the truth value intrinsic in these types of situations. There will be more discussion on this point when preferential truths and universal truths are compared against each other. What is more, there will be a point made at how these two things function differently, propositionally speaking.
Universal Truths
To contrast the content above, it would be wise to show the idea of universal truths, how they function, and what is their purpose. Universal truths are those kinds of truths that are in the category of either/ or which means they are either true or false independent of the subject (i.e. observer). Beckwith and Koukl have this to say regarding truth, “as a subject, I’m communicating a belief that I hold about an external, objective truth,” this comment is coming from the fact that there is a difference between saying something tastes good and the truth of mathematical things such as two plus two.[36] Now, it should be stated that the idea of preferential truth is one that does not require adherence to reality since each person in their respective cases would be creating their own reality in reference to what they prefer over and against another thing. This is not to say that these persons can, in fact, have a preference for something that is or can be universally true since their preference for that thing would have no effect on its truth value since it is intrinsic with the object. However, since one person may enjoy a certain food, and another may not each person has their own reality around how that item tastes. This is not the case with universal truths because they function in such a way that they cannot be individuated into separate realities but rather function strictly within the reality that governs all subjects.
It is important to make such a distinction since the goal, from a postmodern perspective, is to show that all truth is relative to the individual. However, from a basic logical standpoint, there must be at least some truths that are objective or universally knowable. Say for instance that someone makes the claim that all truth is relative. What one has to do here is to turn the claim against itself and ask if that claim is true then it would be a proposition that would be true independent of any subject which would classify it as an objective or universal truth.[37] As can be seen from this basic analysis from this position is that when someone is claiming that there are in fact no objective truths they are claiming by their own very statement an objective truth. Also, with regard to the idea that objective truths ensure that people can function within reality. For example, if nothing could, in fact, be objectively known there would be no place for science since this field investigates things from an empirical perspective but nothing that is submitted could be true since there would be no perimeters that would be governing the objectivity of such statements.
Taking a similar approach as above, universal truths could be arranged in a propositional form. For instance, say that some proposition (like 2+2=4) has to be objectively true or else no one can do mathematics. There was a quote that was used earlier where it stated that most philosophers recognize that mathematics is one of those truths that has to be universal (necessary) in nature. What makes it all the more compelling that such is the case is that there seem to be mathematical patterns that exist within the world that people observe, although this is getting away from the main topic and is delving more into a teleological discussion, the point remains the same, it goes towards showcasing that universal truths indeed have some sort of grounding with the scope of the reality that mankind observes. In the case of the propositional formula, when one has two subjects looking at a universal truth it cannot be broken down into one proposition with its counterfactual being another proposition. This proposition is one that stands on its own and has a conclusion based on the facts of the matter. For example, P1 is 2+2=4 and P2 2+2≠4, both of these propositions by their very nature cannot be true at the same time or in the same way, this shows that it is an either/ or situation. Pointing this out as two separate propositions is more illustrative since it is the conclusion that would be different not the structure of the propositions. Cases like these are the major concern to defend since (as is the position of this discourse) it by its very nature affects how beings interact with reality.
If all of this seems repetitive it must be said that in order for one to learn anything there must be repetition. Also, to speak to this fact, the goal is to explore as many facets of the conversation as possible thereby giving a more rounded examination of the data. As it stands now, one can see how there is an inherent difference in these ideas of preferential and universal truths. One can also see how they operate and function very differently from one another. This is very important to understand since all of these facts will be looked at when presenting an overall defense of the position held, mainly that universal/ objective truths must exist and to hold to a postmodern idea of truths (relativistic) is simply not a livable position.
Universal Versus Preferential Truths
Here, the goal is simply to contrast these ideas a little bit so that the conversation may function in a slightly different manner. Many of the points already brought up will be restated but this goes towards proving a point. The point is that these two concepts differ greatly in what they seek to do and how they actually work. Hopefully, it will be shown that they also talk about vastly different circumstances even though they may be discussing similar content.
Based on what has been presented thus far it should be evident that when discussing a particular proposition that depending on how that proposition functions, with respect to reality, will dictate where the truth value of that statement comes from. If one is discussing how they prefer a certain brand of some particular product then the truth value of such a statement will be found with the subject. The reason for this is (all things being equal, i.e. discussing comparable products/ items) having or purchasing such a product or rather a specific brand of that product will not adversely affect one’s ability to function properly within the scope of reality. For example, say one person has an affinity for a Dodge car and another has the same type of affinity for a Ford car, all things being equal, it does not matter which car one buys because both will perform their function for the operator. Some may argue the point that the quality is much poorer with one than the other, but this is not the point because there can be flaws in one specific vehicle but not in the whole line of vehicles (for instance). Both vehicles (again all things being equal) will do their job for the person who is using it so one can have an aesthetic preference for one over the other. However, if one is talking about the laws of gravity, one cannot argue the point that these (a new made up set) other laws of gravity are better than the ones that we have now. The laws of gravity are what they are and there is no amount of disagreement that will change them. Briefly, someone could suggest that these things are based on semantics and that it may be true these laws are discussed in a particular language now but that language can change in the future but even though the language describing these laws may change the content of what language is describing will not be different (intrinsically). The laws of gravity are simply something that humanity observes to be the case and have to function in the world with those laws. For example, a person would not be logical in claiming that the current laws of gravity are simply superfluous and suggest that there are new laws stating we can float when we heave ourselves off of a tall building and then subsequently do so. Lewis makes a good point here,
The idea was that, just as bodies are governed by the law of gravitation, and organisms by biological laws, so the creature called man also had his law—with this great difference, that a body could not choose whether it obeyed the law of gravitation or not, but a man could choose either to obey the Law of Human Nature or disobey it.[38]
The laws of gravity that govern our reality exist in an either/ or fashion, either the current laws that science has submitted as fact are true or this new set of floating gravitational forces is true but they cannot both be true at the same time, in the same place, in the same way, or even in the same reality.
Going back slightly, since the modern man is interested in keeping his relative freedom truth is being pushed out. Baggett and Walls comment towards this thinking a little bit by suggesting, “truth in terms of anything like certainty was thought beyond our ken; they tended to prefer locutions like ‘warranted assertability instead.’”[39] This thinking comes down to not wanting to assert too much epistemically speaking, but the result is this idea that persons can live in such a way that truth is simply something that warrants assertion (e.g. if the assertion can be done so reasonably). The main concern with ensuring that objective truth is defended is that when one states that there are no objective truths this will and does spill over into the moral realm. If nothing is, in fact, true then nothing is morally true either. Which based on this analysis it can be plainly seen that morality is being and has been relegated to subjectivistic tendencies. The defense here will also include, albeit in an indirect way, a defense for objective moral truths because foundationally speaking if universal/ objective truths do not exist one can assume that objective moral truths do not exist. The goal is to show that defending universal truths is performing a function because moral attitudes are a way in which people properly function in reality as well. This is part of the reason the postmodern idea of relativistic truths is so unlivable because it suggests that morals fall into the same relativistic category. From here the focus will be on reiterating what has been discussed thus far regarding a defense for truth as well as bringing about a more rounded view of the defense.
Defending Truth
Since all of the information so far has been defending truth, in general, the goal here is to connect this to the view of theism. This will by no means be an end-all-be-all argument, but it will be suggested that religious beliefs are not something that can be lumped into the relativistic category of truth claims. What this means is that based on the argumentation so far it will be shown that such worldview systems (atheism and theism) do not possess the qualities of being in the preferential truth category but rather operate under the guidelines of universal truth instead. Essentially, the defense presented will come to a full culmination in favor of theism or at the very least judging the truth of theism on the correct terms.
Based on the knowledge gained throughout this discourse, why would it not be the case that religious beliefs are not preferential truths? The main reason is that these kinds of beliefs arguably affect one’s ability to function within reality. This is the case for either theism or atheism but the position that needs to be highlighted further is that of theism. For the naturalist, what is to follow may be somewhat difficult to give its proper due, but the point remains as it is and does seem to hold, logically speaking. Since theism by its very nature holds that the supernatural is part of its reality, it holds that if this worldview were true the supernatural would be true for everyone regardless of the personal view that they took. What this does is set up a scenario where one has to look at “if” theism were true (Christian theism specifically). If theism were true, the supernatural realm would be a matter of fact and if one were to believe atheism then that would adversely affect their overall functionality within all scopes of reality. To state it plainly, if Christian theism were true then not being a Christian would cause that person to be eternally separated from God upon death (one reality affecting another).
The major issue with this position is that this does not exactly function in the same way for the counterfactual (i.e. atheism). If one flips this around and suggests that atheism is true, then the supernatural does not exist and belief outside of atheism does not affect one's ability to function properly within reality. However, one could suggest that it could impede one’s life somewhat because they would have views about happiness in the end, but it would not be there. But in this case, the person would not know this was the case on this view because they would simply stop existing. This is a problem that can be found since if theism were the case it is without a doubt an either/ or situation. From a pragmatic view, if theism were true then belief outside of this could impact how one interacts with the materialistic sector of reality because morals would be viewed in a far different way. Of course, this is not necessarily the case because on a theistic view whether one believes in a moral lawgiver or not would not negate the fact that a lawgiver actually exists. However, the point remains the same and this is one problem that can be found within this worldview dilemma.
The main reason for bringing attention to this it makes it seem as though theism is the only objective style truth, so by default, someone should take this position. This should be such where that is not the case because the counterfactual, in theory, for this case should show the equal dispersion of truth, but it does not. This may point to the fact that theism has more truth value then does atheism, but this may not be the case.
Moving on from this point, it seems probable that someone can believe in subjective styles of truth and objective truths at the same time. The reason for this line of thinking is because as has been laid out these two things are in different truth categories. Universal truths are those truths that if one were to believe in the opposite they could not function fully within the real world. For instance, if one does not believe that mathematical truths are objective/ universal then one would have a very difficult time managing their bank account, purchasing items, interacting with time, have trouble traveling (dealing with the time, distance aspects). This is not to say that they would cease to function but rather that they would have a lowered effectiveness within reality, per se. Whereas if one takes the subjective style of truth then having a certain preference towards something will not necessarily affect one functionality in a profound way. Based on this fact it should not be difficult to see how there are categories of truth and some of these truths are necessarily true while others are simply contingently true. By suggesting preferential truths are contingent this means that they need a subject to make a choice as to which they prefer. Universal truths simply do not work this way.
A final point of discussion would be to inquire the mind of one that supports the idea of postmodernism and much of this motivation comes from the fact that modernism, in the postmodernists eyes, has failed in such a way that has led the layperson to embrace unsophisticated ideas or to go for an “anything goes” type of living.[40] This is something that was pointed out above when it was suggested that the sort of realism that is being propagated here has not been stated very clearly or been proven in such a way that one could place it in the same category as socially constructed events as dictating truth/ knowledge. Nicolson has suggested that “knowledge production is a highly social activity in which questions of credibility and trust in others, and communal practices of acknowledgment, correction, and critique, are as essential as perception and reason.”[41] On this point, there is no contention that knowledge and the learning of truth is highly social and that correction is very important to the process. But with that said, this process could not be fully complete unless there was a form of truth that was above those who we were trying to correct. Otherwise, it would be one perceiver of whatever reality they subscribe to trying to persuade another perceiver that their reality is not as functionally adequate as their own. For the sake of argument here, let it be said that what is being suggested is actually the case, then truth is not really of any relevance in life at all nor the pursuit of truth because structurally it serves no actual purpose. Put another way, if truth (in this sense) is just building on the social environment, it is not truth but a construction of ideas that perceivers are simply using to construct the most livable reality they can, but it could not be classified as truth because it would be a changing event. So, in this sense truth-value would be meaningless since it would undergo an immense amount of changing, this would be labeled progress in the postmodernists mind.
But why would it be suggested that this could not be classified as truth? Truth, traditionally known, is a state of something being what it is regardless of a commonly held disagreement with whatever that truth is. If reality is dictating that this certain thing is true, then it does not matter what one says against it. Phillip K. Dick perhaps has given a most succinct rendition of this concept of reality, “reality is that which when you stop believing in it, it doesn’t go away.”[42] Though this can be found in a novel the truth behind this statement is astounding. But what if someone simply argued that they did not care about truth or being consistent or maybe they decided one day to be consistent and another day not to be, what does this in actuality matter? Well, firstly, what has been laid out thoroughly throughout this writing should be blatantly evident against this claim since being able to function properly within reality is validation to pursue truth. Secondly, just because one does not care about truth and its effect on their reality, the reality is still present (as indicated by Dick). Also, this issue goes far deeper than being consistent or not because being human comes with the inevitable fact that some days will be inconsistent. The more forceful concern here is that moving towards a cause, something more than just existing (even a naturalist can follow along this point). The goal is to ensure the most out of what is, not by brandishing some ideas for the sake of doing so. The goal is to pursue something that will produce in humanity the spirit of development and leveling the ground as even across the board. The best manner in which to level the playing ground is to discover the universality of some truths because this fact alone will render, those who seek to suggest their truth is better than anyone else’s, as innate since their truth is irrelevant because there is a truth that governs everyone equally.
Conclusion
When glancing back over the material presented it should be at least obvious that there are different categories of truth. By recognizing this it places a burden on the subject to rightfully judge the truth value of certain things properly. Also, it should be easily recognizable that the postmodern movement, which suggests relativistic truth, is something that is just not a livable view to have since based on this view the subject would lack any ability to come to the full knowledge of many things. By this, it suggests that since all truth is relative to the subject nothing is, in fact, knowable because it is based on the interpretation of the subject and not the object. Also, based on what has been presented it should be understood that theism does not fit into a relativistic truth category and thus should be judged based on this fact. This means that for theism it is an either/ or endeavor and one must make a determination on this fact. Overall, the goal was to show that a postmodern idea of relative truth is an unlivable view to hold and this task has been accomplished, at least to a moderate degree. Truth is one thing that all humans should strive for even if discovering such truth requires a dynamic shift in thinking. Truth has value and should be judged by that value.
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Armstrong, D. M. Belief, Truth, and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
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Beckwith, Francis J. and Gregory Koukl. Relativism: Feet Firmly Planted in Mid-Air. Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998.
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Otto, Randell. “Renewing our Mind: Reformed Epistemology and the Task of Apologetics.” Evangelical Quarterly 88.2 (2016/17): 111-125.
Plantinga, Alvin Knowledge and Christian Belief. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015.
Plantinga, Alvin Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford: Oxford Press, 2000.
Posey, Kamili. “On Classical Pragmatist Foundations in Naturalized Epistemology.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 50 no. 1 (2014): 18-28.
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[1] W. Jay Wood, Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually Virtuous (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 1998), 10.
[2] Ibid., 14.
[3] Garrett J. DeWeese and J. P. Moreland, Philosophy Made Slightly Less Difficult (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2005), 54.
[4] J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2003), Ch. 3. This is an ebook source without pagination so all references from this source will be listed by chapter.
[5] D. M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth, and Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 137.
[6] Wood, Epistemology, 175-176.
[7] Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, Ch. 7.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Randell Otto, “Renewing our Mind: Reformed Epistemology and the Task of Apologetics” Evangelical Quarterly 88.2 (2016/17): 117.
[10] Alvin Plantinga, Knowledge and Christian Belief (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 36.
[11] Plantinga, Knowledge, 37.
[12] Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford Press, 2000), 172.
[13] Ibid., 173.
[14] Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, Ch. 7.
[15] Douglas Groothuis, Christian Apologetics: A Comprehensive Case for Biblical Faith (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2011), 132.
[16] Ibid., Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, Ch. 6. Both authors discuss the same point but at this particular juncture they both refer to this theory being a “web of belief.”
[17] Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, Ch. 6. This example is not directly what is used by these authors however it is a reconstructed version of the example that they used.
[18] Noah Lemos, An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 12.
[19] Ibid., 13.
[20] Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, Ch. 6.
[21] Groothuis, Christian Apologetics, 133.
[22] Kamili Posey, “On Classical Pragmatist Foundations in Naturalized Epistemology,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 50 no. 1 (2014): 19.
[23] Posey, “Pragmatist Foundations,” 20.
[24] Stephen Stich, “Naturalizing Epistemology: Quine, Simon and the Prospects for Pragmatism,” Philosophy (Jan 1993): 8.
[25] Groothuis, Christian Apologetics, 124.
[26] Aristotle, Categories, chapter 5, 4a35.
[27] Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy trans. Donald A. Cress (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1641), 35. Though Descartes does not explicitly use the common phraseology of “I think therefore I am” he does speak about the same topic just in different words.
[28] Groothuis, Christian Apologetics, 124.
[29] Lemos, Theory of Knowledge, 10.
[30] Groothuis, Christian Apologetics, 126.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Laurent Cesalli and Nadja Germann, “Signification and Truth Epistemology at the Crossroads of Semantics and Ontology in Augustine’s Early Philosophical Writings” Vivarium 46 no. 2 (2008): 153.
[33] C. Stephen Laymen, “A Moral Argument for the Existence of God” in Is Goodness Without God Good Enough? eds. Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 51.
[34] Mihnea D. I. Capraru, “Objective Truth in Matters of Taste” Philosophical Studies 173 (2016): 1761. This point is not a direct quotation or the direct words but is a point made when contrasting two people’s opinions on liking bittersweet chocolate.
[35] Capraru, “Matters of Taste,” 1765.
[36] Francis J. Beckwith and Gregory Koukl, Relativism: Feet Firmly Planted in Mid-Air (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998), 27.
[38] C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: HarperCollins, 1952), 4. Lewis is discussing moral truths in this section of the book but based on what is being suggested in this discourse is that a person’s view of truth influences their view morality.
[39] David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, God and Cosmos: Moral Truth and Human Meaning (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 31.
[40] Donald Nicolson, “Taking Epistemology Seriously: Truth, Reason, and Justice Revisited” The International Journal of Evidence and Proof 17 (2013): 7.
[41] Nicolson, “Taking Epistemology Seriously,” 22.
[42] Phillip K. Dick, Valis (New York: Bantam, 1981), 77.
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